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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 04-1458
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ARTHUR C. PARKER,
Appellant.
_____
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
District Judge:  The Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
(Criminal No. 02-220 (JBS))
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 3, 2004
BEFORE: ALITO, BARRY and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: April 14, 2005)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
2FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Arthur C. Parker pled guilty to bank robbery.  The District Court
sentenced him to 71 months imprisonment, three years of supervised release and a special
assessment of $100.00.  Parker filed a pro se petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to
vacate the sentence.  Harold B. Shapiro, Esq. was appointed counsel pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3006A and filed a notice of appeal on Parker’s behalf.  Mr. Shapiro then filed a
brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).  Counsel
indicated that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal.  After the Supreme Court
severed and excised § 3553(b)(1) of the federal sentencing statute in United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), rendering the Sentencing Guidelines advisory,
this Court issued an order permitting counsel to appeal Parker’s sentence and he did so.
We have carefully reviewed the briefs submitted by Mr. Shapiro, the United States,
and Parker, as well as other matters of record.  We conclude, after our own review of the
entire record, that the District Court did not err as to Parker’s conviction.  We remand for
re-sentencing.
I.
Parker, a paranoid schizophrenic, was indicted for one count of bank robbery
under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).  At his initial plea hearing, defense counsel represented that
Parker had been hospitalized for paranoid schizophrenia and depression and that on
various occasions, including the hearing itself, Parker represents himself as God.  In
3particular, Parker reported that three angels that had accompanied him to earth had
instructed him to rob the bank.
Defense counsel then summarized the findings of Clinical and Forensic
Psychologist Dr. Gerald Cooke, who performed a number of psychological tests on Parker
and reviewed notes from Parker’s previous psychiatric treatment.  Dr. Cooke found that
Parker had a “hint of schizophrenia...now in remission” but was not “currently psychotic,”
“knew right from wrong,” and was “competent to enter a guilty plea.”  App. 14, 36-37. 
Parker himself not only insisted that he was competent to plea but specifically testified
that he knew robbing the bank was wrong and could result in punishment, and that he
understood the roles of the District Judge, his own attorney, and the Assistant United
States Attorney.
Nevertheless, in appropriate doubt as to Parker’s competency, the District Court
adjourned this initial plea hearing in order to obtain a copy of the report from Dr. Cooke. 
At the second hearing, Judge Simandle found that Dr. Cooke deemed Parker competent
despite profound mental problems in the past; Parker was able to communicate with his
attorney; and Parker knowingly rejected her recommendation that the proceeding be
postponed while investigations into certain bank robberies in Philadelphia were
conducted, even though a sentence in that proceeding could increase any sentence he
might receive for those other robberies.  The court accepted Parker’s guilty plea.
II.
4Parker could challenge his conviction on the grounds that he was not competent to
plead guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).  It is undisputed that he was mentally ill and was
not on medication at the time of his plea.  Several factors give this Court additional pause
with respect to certain aspects of his competency.  Parker made various statements
indicating that he was taking the fall for actions done in concert with angels who were
directing him and that “in a hundred years it won’t matter” because “Judgment Day is
close.”  Those statements might suggest that though Parker understood that the
proceeding was intended to adjudicate his guilt and would result in punishment, he did
not appreciate the significance of his guilt or prospective punishment as a sane person
usually would.
The District Court was apparently sensitive to concerns regarding Parker’s
competency and took specific actions designed to ensure that Parker was in fact
competent to plead.  The judge deferred Parker’s plea until he was able to review the
report of Dr. Cooke.  He proceeded only after he was satisfied that not only Parker’s own
counsel but also Parker’s psychologist deemed Parker competent to plead.
The District Court’s judgment is not contradicted by any recent evidence that
would suggest that, at the time of his plea, Parker was not just mentally ill but so mentally
ill as to render him incompetent.  The most troubling evidence of mental illness was too
dated to reflect Parker’s capacities at the time of the plea hearing.  In light of the above
facts, the District Court’s finding of competency was not plain error.  See United States v.
5Knobloch, 131 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying plain error standard of review
where defendant did not object before District Court).
Accordingly, we conclude, as did Parker’s counsel, Mr. Shapiro, that Parker has no
non-frivolous argument with which to challenge his conviction.  We therefore affirm the
judgment of conviction.  However, having determined that the sentencing issues appellant
raises are best determined by the District Court in the first instance, we vacate his
sentence and remand for resentencing according to Booker.  
